A collision occurred. Navigation went wrong. A command decision placed the vessel or aircraft in danger it should not have faced. Article 110 of the UCMJ-improper hazarding of a vessel or aircraft-covers the willful or negligent hazarding of any vessel or aircraft in the U.S. armed forces.
For high-profile naval or aviation accidents, Article 110 is one of the charges that flows from the investigation into what went wrong and who is responsible. The article requires more than that an accident occurred: for the willful theory, it requires that the hazarding was done deliberately; for the negligent theory, it requires culpable negligence-more than ordinary inattention.
Article 110, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 910, covers both the willful and negligent hazarding of any vessel or aircraft of the United States armed forces. The willful theory carries the death penalty and applies when a service member deliberately endangered the vessel or aircraft. The negligent theory carries substantially lower maximum punishment and applies when the hazarding resulted from culpable negligence. Joseph L. Jordan is a former Army JAG Officer who served as both a prosecutor and defense counsel, including as a former military prosecutor at Fort Cavazos, Texas.
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The word “willfully” is doing all the heavy lifting in this element, and it is where the government’s case most often falls apart-proving that a service member deliberately endangered a vessel rather than made a judgment call under pressure is a burden the prosecution rarely meets cleanly.
The distinction between willful and negligent hazarding turns on the accused’s mental state: did the accused deliberately endanger the vessel or aircraft, or was the hazarding the result of culpable negligence?
The distinction between willful hazarding and negligent hazarding determines both the defense strategy and the maximum punishment. Defense counsel targets this classification because proving deliberate endangerment of a vessel requires evidence far beyond a navigational error or judgment call under pressure.
|
Theory |
Maximum Punishment |
|
Willful hazarding |
Death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct |
|
Negligent hazarding |
Dishonorable discharge, confinement for 2 years, forfeiture |
Under this Article of the UCMJ, the death penalty is authorized only in time of war. Congress has not formally declared war since World War II, which significantly limits the practical application of this maximum punishment. The death penalty is available for willful hazarding. The negligent theory carries a maximum of 2 years confinement. Defense counsel evaluates the sentencing exposure at every stage of the case and addresses the gap between maximum authorized punishment and likely sentencing outcomes based on the specific facts, the accused’s record, and the jurisdiction’s sentencing patterns.
Vulnerability 1: The hazarding was not willful-the government is overcharging.
The government sometimes charges willful hazarding in cases where the evidence supports only negligence. Defense counsel challenges the willfulness element by establishing that the conduct, while potentially negligent, was not deliberately dangerous. This challenge has direct sentencing consequences given the dramatic difference in maximum punishment between the two theories.
Vulnerability 2: The conduct was not culpably negligent-it was ordinary human error.
Negligent hazarding requires culpable negligence-a degree of negligence that is more than ordinary inattention. A decision that was within the range of reasonable judgment calls under difficult conditions, even if it contributed to an accident, may not satisfy the culpable negligence standard. Defense counsel presents expert testimony on the operational conditions and the demands placed on the accused at the time.
Mr. Jordan has tried 250+ cases to verdict and represented more than 1,000 service members. His practice is not geographically limited: Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard, and Space Force, at installations across the United States, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. He gets on a plane.
Vulnerability 3: The hazarding was caused by factors outside the accused’s control.
Equipment failures, weather conditions, failures by other crew members, and other external factors that contributed to or caused the hazarding may negate the accused’s legal responsibility. Defense counsel develops the full causation record and challenges the government’s theory that the accused’s conduct was the operative cause of the hazarding.
Vulnerability 4: The accused acted consistently with applicable regulations and standards.
In complex naval and aviation environments, service members act in accordance with established procedures, regulations, and command directives. Conduct that was consistent with applicable regulations and that would have been proper under any reasonable interpretation of the applicable standards is a defense to the negligence theory.
A conviction under this article carries consequences beyond the sentence imposed at court-martial. A bad-conduct discharge eliminates most VA benefits including GI Bill education benefits and VA home loan eligibility. A federal conviction record appears on all background checks and must be disclosed on employment applications, security clearance questionnaires, and professional licensing applications. Security clearances are typically revoked upon conviction, limiting post-military career options in cleared positions. Defense counsel evaluates collateral consequences as part of the overall case strategy, including whether alternative dispositions such as nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 may achieve a resolution that avoids a federal criminal conviction.
Article 110 improper hazarding of a vessel requires proof that the accused willfully and wrongfully hazarded a vessel of the naval service. The technical maritime and navigation standards applicable to the vessel and its operation at the time of the charged conduct are central to the defense. Defense counsel retains qualified maritime navigation experts to analyze the vessel’s position, course, speed, weather conditions, traffic separation schemes, and the specific navigation decisions made by the accused. Expert testimony on what a competent officer of the deck or commanding officer would have done under the specific conditions is critical. The distinction between negligent hazarding and willful hazarding determines both the theory and the maximum punishment. Willful hazarding requires proof that the accused was aware of and consciously disregarded the risk to the vessel.
Negligent hazarding reflects a failure to exercise the care required of someone in the accused’s position. Defense counsel challenges the government’s characterization of the accused’s mental state and presents evidence of the accused’s navigation decisions in the context of all available information at the time. The Navy and Coast Guard take vessel hazarding extremely seriously because the lives of all personnel aboard depend on competent navigation and ship handling. Defense counsel presents the accused’s training record, qualifications, and prior performance to contextualize the charged conduct and to challenge the inference of willful disregard.
If you are facing Article 110 charges, the decisions you make now determine the shape of your entire defense. Evidence is preserved or lost in the first days. Witness accounts solidify. Command dynamics shift.
Call (888) 367-9489 now for a free consultation. Available 24/7.
Article 134 and general UCMJ offenses give commanders broad charging authority, which means the government has wide discretion in how it frames the alleged conduct. That discretion creates both risk and opportunity: risk because the charge can be stretched to cover conduct that does not squarely fit the elements, and opportunity because defense counsel can challenge whether the specific conduct actually satisfies each element the government must prove. Mr. Jordan has prosecuted and defended these cases and understands how the government builds its evidentiary chain, where that chain is weakest, and what defense strategies produce results at trial and in pretrial negotiations. Joseph L. Jordan is a former Army JAG Officer who served as both a prosecutor and defense counsel, including as a former military prosecutor at Fort Cavazos, Texas and with the 2nd Infantry Division in South Korea.
He has prosecuted and defended cases across the full range of UCMJ offenses and understands how charging decisions are made and where they can be challenged. He practices exclusively in military law and is highly experienced in criminal trial advocacy. Call (888) 367-9489 now. Available 24/7. Joseph L. Jordan has defended service members facing these charges across all military branches. Review our case results for examples of cases we have handled. Past results do not guarantee future outcomes; every case depends on its own facts. Before speaking to investigators or law enforcement, assert your Article 31 rights. Understand the full court-martial process before your case proceeds.
Can the commanding officer of a vessel or aircraft be personally charged under Article 110 for a collision?
Yes. Commanding officers bear legal responsibility for the safety of their vessels or aircraft. A commanding officer whose decisions or failures contributed to a collision or other hazarding incident may be charged under Article 110. However, the government must still prove the specific elements-willfulness or culpable negligence-not merely that the commanding officer was in command when the accident occurred.
Does Article 110 apply to Army and Air Force aircraft as well as Navy vessels?
Yes. Article 110 covers vessels and aircraft of all branches of the armed forces. It is not limited to naval vessels. The article covers any vessel or aircraft under military jurisdiction regardless of the operating branch. Defense counsel examines whether the specific vehicle or aircraft falls within the article’s jurisdictional reach.
When the hazarding results in injury or death, the government may also charge or depending on the circumstances.Article 119 (manslaughter)Article 118 (murder)
Can Article 110 charges be resolved without a court-martial?
Yes. Depending on the facts and the command climate, Article 110 charges may be resolved through nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, administrative action, or pretrial negotiation. Defense counsel evaluates every available disposition path and advises on the option that best serves the accused’s long-term interests.
Is there a statute of limitations for Article 110?
As a capital offense, Article 110 carries no statute of limitations under Article 43, UCMJ. The government may bring charges at any time, regardless of how many years have passed since the alleged offense. This means service members remain subject to prosecution for the duration of their lives.
This page provides general legal information about Article 110, UCMJ. It does not constitute legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Every case depends on its own facts. If you are facing charges under Article 110, contact a qualified military defense attorney. Call (888) 367-9489 for a free and confidential consultation.
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Joseph L. Jordan is a UCMJ lawyer serving all six branches of the Armed Forces.
